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Abstract
This paper is devoted to the complete axiomatization of dynamic extensions of arrow logic
based on a restriction of propositional dynamic logic with intersection. Our deductive systems
contain an unorthodox inference rule: the inference rule of intersection. The proof of the com-
pleteness of our deductive systems uses the technique of the canonical model.
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1. Introduction
Within the framework of the research carried out into the subject of arrow logic,
arrows may be considered as abstract objects equipped with the ternary relation of
composition C, the binary relation of converse R and the unary relation of identity
I . Intuitively speaking, C(x; y; z) means that arrow x is a composition of arrows y
and z, R(x; y) means that arrow x is a converse of arrow y and I(x) means that
arrow x is an identity arrow. In this approach, arrows have no explicitly stated internal
structure, seeing that one uses arrow frames of the form (W;C; R; I) where W is a
nonempty set of arrows, C is a ternary relation on W , R is a binary relation on
W and I is a unary relation on W . These frames constitute the semantical basis of
a propositional modal logic with the binary modality •, the unary modality ⊗ and
the nullary modality id corresponding to the relations of composition, converse and
identity between arrows. Venema [19] gives an extensive introduction to this approach.
Another approach is possible and consists in considering arrows as concrete objects
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with a beginning and an end. In this approach arrows have an explicitly stated internal
structure, for the simple reason that one uses arrow frames of the form (Ar; Po; f)
where Ar is a nonempty set of arrows, Po is a nonempty set of points and f is a
function from Ar×{1; : : : ; n} to Po. Intuitively speaking f(x; 1) de>nes the beginning
point of arrow x, f(x; 2); : : : ; f(x; n − 1) de>ne the intermediate points of arrow x
and f(x; n) de>nes the end point of arrow x. Using the function f one can de>ne
the following binary relations between arrows: for all i; j∈{1; : : : ; n}, let xR(i; j)y i@
f(x; i)=f(y; j). These binary relations explore the di@erent possibilities for two arrows
to share points, and are used as the semantical basis of a propositional modal logic
with the unary modalities [i; j] corresponding to the binary relations R(i; j) between
arrows. The >rst propositional modal logic of this type is introduced by Vakarelov
[16,17] who shows that the interest to consider the binary relations R(i; j) between
arrows stems from the fact that the >rst-order conditions which characterize them are
modally de>nable. In other respects it appears that, in the particular case where n=2,
the relations of composition, converse and identity have simple de>nitions in terms of
the relations R(i; j): C(x; y; z) i@ xR(1; 1)y, xR(2; 2)z and yR(2; 1)z, R(x; y) i@ xR(1; 2)y
and xR(2; 1)y, I(x) i@ xR(1; 2)x. Moreover, in the general case where n¿3, one may
consider the extension of arrow logic with the modalities [i] corresponding to the
intersection of the binary relations R(j; j) for all j∈{1; : : : ; n} such that i = j. However
neither the modalities •, ⊗ and id, in the particular case where n=2, nor the modalities
[i], in the general case where n¿3, are de>nable in terms of the modalities [i; j].
Nevertheless, these modalities are de>nable in a dynamic extension of arrow logic. Our
dynamic extension of arrow logic is an iteration-free propositional dynamic logic with
intersection, the atomic programs of which correspond to the binary relations R(i; j)
between arrows. This paper is devoted to its complete axiomatization. Our deductive
systems contain an unorthodox inference rule: the inference rule of intersection. The
proof of the completeness of our deductive systems uses the technique of the canonical
model. The plan of the paper is as follows. Arrow structures and arrow frames are
introduced in Section 2. Section 3 presents the basic arrow logic as well as some
of its extensions. The iteration-free propositional dynamic logic with intersection is
presented in Section 4. Our dynamic extension of arrow logic uses the concepts de>ned
in Sections 3 and 4. It is introduced and developed in Section 5.
2. Arrow structures and arrow frames
Adapted from Vakarelov [17], an arrow structure will be any structure of the form
S =(Ar; Po; f) where
• Ar is a nonempty set of arrows;
• Po is a nonempty set of points;
• f is a function with domain Ar×{1; : : : ; n} and range Po.
Arrow structure S =(Ar; Po; f) will be de>ned to be normal if for all x; y∈Ar:
• If f(x; 1)=f(y; 1); : : : ; f(x; n)=f(y; n) then x=y.
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Arrow structures constitute the starting point for the formal examination of the
relationships that reEect the ways arrows share points. Given any arrow structure
S =(Ar; Po; f), the arrow frame derived from S is the structure of the form FS =
(WS; {RS(i; j): i; j∈{1; : : : ; n}}) where
• WS =Ar;
• For all i; j∈{1; : : : ; n}, RS(i; j) is the binary relation on WS de>ned as follows for
all x; y∈WS :
◦ xRS(i; j)y i@ f(x; i)=f(y; j).
We leave it to the reader to prove the following result.
Proposition 1. Let S =(Ar; Po; f) be an arrow structure and FS =(WS; {RS(i; j):
i; j∈{1; : : : ; n}}) be the arrow frame derived from S. For all i; j; k ∈{1; : : : ; n} and
for all x; y; z ∈WS :
T(i) xRS(i; i)x;
B(i, j) If xRS(i; j)y then yRS(j; i)x;
4(i ,j ,k) If xRS(i; j)y and yRS(j; k)z then xRS(i; k)z.
Moreover, if S is normal then for all x; y∈WS :
(?) If xRS(1; 1)y; : : : ; xRS(n; n)y then x=y.
Proposition 1 motivates the following de>nitions. An arrow frame is a structure of
the form F =(W; {R(i; j): i; j∈{1; : : : ; n}}) where
• W is a nonempty set of arrows;
• For all i; j∈{1; : : : ; n}, R(i; j) is a binary relation on W ;
• For all i; j; k ∈{1; : : : ; n} and for all x; y; z ∈W , the conditions T(i), B(i, j) and
4(i , j ,k) of Proposition 1 are satis>ed.
Arrow frame F =(W; {R(i; j): i; j∈{1; : : : ; n}}) will be de>ned to be normal if for
all x; y∈W , the condition (?) of Proposition 1 is satis>ed. An important step in the
study of arrow frames is their representability. Generalizing the logical foundations of
coincidence relations in arrow structures developed by Vakarelov [16], Vakarelov [17]
was the >rst to prove the following result.
Proposition 2 (Characterization theorem for arrow frames). Let F =(W; {R(i; j): i; j∈
{1; : : : ; n}}) be an arrow frame. There is an arrow structure S =(Ar; Po; f) such that
the arrow frame FS =(WS; {RS(i; j): i; j∈{1; : : : ; n}}) derived from S is isomorphic
to F. Moreover, if F is normal then S is normal.
Proposition 2 suggests de>ning propositional modal logics with standard interpreta-
tion in arrow frames.
3. Basic arrow logic
The most natural way to de>ne propositional modal logics with standard interpre-
tation in arrow frames is to extend the language of propositional classical logic with
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the modalities [i; j] corresponding to the binary relations R(i; j). The >rst propositional
modal logics of this type were given by Vakarelov [16] in the particular case where
n=2 and Vakarelov [17] in the general case where n¿3.
3.1. Syntax
The set of all formulas is de>ned as follows:
•  ::=p | ⊥ | (→  ) | [i; j];
where p ranges over a countably in>nite set of propositional variables and i; j range
over the set {1; : : : ; n}. We will use ,  , , etc., for formulas. It is well worth noting
that each formula is a >nite string of symbols, these symbols coming from a countable
alphabet. It follows that there are countably many formulas. Other connectives are
introduced by the usual abbreviations. We shall agree to use the most readable notation
for formulas. This permits us to adopt the standard rules for omission of the parentheses.
3.2. Semantics
The standard semantics for this language is a Kripke-style semantics over arrow
frames. Let F =(W; {R(i; j): i; j∈{1; : : : ; n}}) be an arrow frame. A function V with
domain the set of all propositional variables and range the set of all subsets of W will
be de>ned to be a valuation on F . The pair M =(F; V ) is called the model over F
de-ned from V. We de>ne the relation “formula  is true at arrow x in model M”,
denoted M; x |=, as follows:
• M; x |=p i@ x∈V (p);
• M; x |=⊥;
• M; x |=→  i@ if M; x |= then M; x |=  ;
• M; x |= [i; j] i@ for all y∈W , if xR(i; j)y then M; y |=.
Formula  is true in model M , denoted M |=, if for all x∈W , M; x |=. Formula
 is true in arrow frame F , denoted F |=, if  is true in all models over F . Formula
 is true in a set  of arrow frames, denoted  |=, if  is true in all arrow frames
of . The set of all formulas true in a set  of arrow frames is denoted L(). Let us
introduce the following sets of arrow frames:
• ARROWn is the set of all arrow frames;
• ARROWnNOR is the set of all normal arrow frames;
• ARROWnFIN is the set of all >nite arrow frames;
• ARROWnFINNOR is the set of all >nite normal arrow frames.
3.3. Axiomatization
Let BALn be the smallest normal logic that contains the axioms given below:
T(i) →〈i; i〉;
B(i, j) → [i; j]〈j; i〉;
4(i , j ,k) 〈i; j〉〈j; k〉→〈i; k〉.
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A formula  is called provable in BALn, denoted BALn , if  belongs to
BALn.
3.4. Completeness
The proof of the following completeness theorem for BALn uses general techniques
that can be found in most elementary texts.
Theorem 3 (Completeness theorem for BALn). Let  be a formula. The following
conditions are equivalent:
• BALn ;
• ∈L(ARROWn);
• ∈L(ARROWnNOR);
• ∈L(ARROWnFIN );
• ∈L(ARROWnFINNOR).
Completeness theorem for BALn was >rst shown by Vakarelov [16] in the particular
case where n=2 and Vakarelov [17] in the general case where n¿3.
3.5. Extensions of basic arrow logic
The language of our propositional modal logics can be extended in di@erent ways. In
the particular case where n=2, we can think of a set of arrows as a device which pro-
duces an output for any input. Then, for all arrow frames F =(W; {R(i; j): i; j∈{1; 2}}),
the following operations on sets of arrows are de>ned for all subsets #; $ of W :
Composition: # • $= {x: x∈W and there are y; z ∈W such that xR(1; 1)y, xR(2; 2)z,
yR(2; 1)z, y∈ # and z ∈ $};
Converse: ⊗#={x: x∈W and there is y∈W such that xR(1; 2)y, xR(2; 1)y and y∈ #};
Identity: id= {x: x∈W and xR(1; 2)x}.
Within this context, it is natural to consider the extension of BAL2 with the modalities
•, ⊗ and id corresponding to the operations of composition, converse and identity on
sets of arrows in arrow frames. To be more precise, the set of all formulas of the
extended language is de>ned as follows:
•  ::=p | ⊥ | (→  ) | [i; j] | ( •  ) | ⊗ | id;
where the semantics of the new modalities is de>ned as follows:
• M; x |= •  i@ there is y; z ∈W such that xR(1; 1)y, xR(2; 2)z, yR(2; 1)z, M; y |=
 and M; z |=  ;
• M; x |=⊗ i@ there is y∈W such that xR(1; 2)y, xR(2; 1)y and M; y |=;
• M; x |= id i@ xR(1; 2)x.
The extension of BAL2 with the modalities •, ⊗ and id has been considered by
Arsov [1], Arsov and Marx [2] and Marx [13]. In the general case where n¿3,
Vakarelov [17] has considered the extension of BALn with the modalities [i]
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corresponding for all arrow frames F =(W; {R(i; j): i; j∈{1; 2}}) to the intersection
of the binary relations R(j; j) on W for all j∈{1; : : : ; n} such that i = j. Formally, the
set of all formulas of the extended language is de>ned as follows:
•  ::=p | ⊥ | (→  ) | [i; j] | [i];
where the semantics of the new modalities is de>ned as follows:
• M; x |= [i] i@ for all y∈W , if xR(j; j)y for all j∈{1; : : : ; n} such that i = j, then
M; y |=.
Let us be clear that neither the modalities •, ⊗ and id, in the particular case where
n=2, nor the modalities [i], in the general case where n¿3, are modally de>nable in
the basic language of arrow logic. However, these modalities will become de>nable in
our dynamic extension of arrow logic, an iteration-free PDL with intersection the atomic
programs of which correspond for all arrow frames F =(W; {R(i; j): i; j∈{1; 2}}) to
the binary relations R(i; j).
4. Iteration-free PDL with intersection
Propositional dynamic logic, PDL, is a polymodal logic with the following operations
in the set of modalities:
• Composition &; ': sequential execution of programs & and ' corresponding to the
composition of the accessibility relations R(&) and R(').
• Disjunction &∨ ': nondeterministic choice of programs & and ' corresponding to the
union of R(&) and R(').
• Iteration &?: nondeterministic iteration of program & corresponding to the transitive
closure of R(&).
• Test ?: an operation transforming the formula  into a program ? corresponding
to the partial identity relation in the states of the PDL-models where the formula 
is true.
Balbiani and Vakarelov [6] were the >rst to propose a complete axiomatization of
iteration-free PDL with intersection, an extension of the iteration-free fragment of PDL
with the following operation in the set of modalities:
• Intersection &∧ ': conjunction of programs & and ' corresponding to the intersection
of R(&) and R(').
The question of the complete axiomatization of iteration-free PDL with intersection
lies outside the scope of this paper. However, we present the line of reasoning suggested
by Balbiani and Vakarelov [6], because we will follow the same line of reasoning with
respect to the complete axiomatization of our dynamic extension of arrow logic.
4.1. Syntax
We now give a formal de>nition of the syntax of iteration-free PDL with intersection,
PDL∩0 . The set of all formulas and the set of all programs of the language of PDL
∩
0
P. Balbiani, D. Vakarelov / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 127 (2004) 1–15 7
are de>ned as follows:
•  ::=p | ⊥ | (→  ) | [&];
• & ::=  | (&; ') | (&∨ ') | (&∧ ') | ?;
where p ranges over a countably in>nite set of propositional variables and  ranges
over a countable set of atomic programs. We will use &, ', (, etc., for programs. The
method developed by Balbiani and Vakarelov [6] uses a special inference rule, the
inference rule of intersection. For its de>nition, the concept of admissible form will be
of use to us. Each admissible form has a positive integer as a rank and the de>nition
of admissible forms is by induction on the rank. Let the syntax be extended with a
new propositional variable ]. If &(]?) is a program with a unique occurrence of the
test ]? as a part of it then for all formulas , &(?) will denote the program obtained
as the result of the replacement of the propositional variable ] in its place in &(]?)
with the formula . The admissible forms are de>ned as follows:
• For all programs &(]?) with a unique occurrence of the test ]? as a subprogram,
&(]?) is an admissible form of rank 0.
• For all positive integers a, for all programs &(]?) with a unique occurrence of the
test ]? as a subprogram, for all admissible forms '(]?) of rank a and for all formulas
 with no occurrence of the propositional variable ] as a part of it, &(¬ ['(]?)]?)
is an admissible form of rank a+ 1.
Note that each admissible form &(]?) contains a unique occurrence of the test ]? as
a part of it. What is more, test ]? occurs as a subprogram of admissible form &(]?)
only if &(]?) is of rank 0.
4.2. Semantics
The standard semantics for the language of PDL∩0 uses the concept of PDL-frame,
i.e., structures of the form F =(W;R) where W is a nonempty set of states and R is
a function with domain the set of all atomic programs and range the set of all binary
relations on W . A function V with domain the set of all propositional variables and
range the set of all subsets of W will be called valuation on F . We shall say that the
pair M =(F; V ) is the PDL-model over F de-ned from V. The relation “formula  is
true at state x in PDL-model M”, denoted M; x |=, is inductively de>ned as follows:
• M; x |=p i@ x∈V (p);
• M; x |=⊥;
• M; x |=→  i@ if M; x |= then M; x |=  ;
• M; x |= [&] i@ for all y∈W , if x MR(&)y then M; y |=;
where the binary relations MR(&) on W corresponding to the modalities [&] reEect the
intended meanings of programs &:
• MR()=R();
• MR(&; ')= MR(&) ◦ MR(');
• MR(&∨ ')= MR(&)∪ MR(');
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• MR(&∧ ')= MR(&)∩ MR(');
• MR(?)= {(x; x): M; x |=}.
Formula  is true in PDL-model M , denoted M |=, if for all x∈W , M; x |=.
Formula  is true in PDL-frame F , denoted F |=, if  is true in all PDL-models
over F . Formula  is true in a set  of PDL-frames, denoted  |=, if  is true in
all PDL-frames of . The set of all formulas true in a set  of PDL-frames is denoted
L(). Let PDL be the set of all PDL-frames.
4.3. Axiomatization
The axiomatic system for PDL∩0 developed by Balbiani and Vakarelov [6] is the
smallest normal logic in the language of PDL∩0 that contains all the instances of the
following axiom schemata:
• 〈&; '〉↔〈&〉〈'〉;
• 〈&∨ '〉↔〈&〉∨ 〈'〉;
• 〈&∧ '〉→〈&〉∧ 〈'〉;
• 〈&∧ ('∨ ()〉↔〈&∧ '〉∨ 〈&∧ (〉;
• 〈?〉 ↔∧  ;
and is closed under the following inference rule:
• If for all propositional variables p, PDL∩0 [&(¬(〈'〉(∧p)∨ 〈(〉(∧¬p))?)] thenPDL∩0 [&(¬ 〈'∧ (〉?)] ;
where &(]?) is an admissible form. Following standard usage, PDL∩0  means that  is
a theorem of PDL∩0 . The inference rule of intersection is similar in some sense to the
inference rules considered by Goranko [10] and Venema [18]. It is based on the follow-
ing idea. Although intersection of programs is not de>nable in ordinary quanti>er-free
polymodal logics, intersection of programs becomes de>nable in polymodal logics with
quanti>cation over propositional variables. In the language of PDL∩0 , the inference rule
of intersection simulates this de>nition of the operation of intersection. We conclude
this section by the soundness theorem of PDL∩0 .
Theorem 4 (Soundness theorem of PDL∩0 ). Let  be a formula. If PDL∩0  then
∈L(PDL).
Proof. See Balbiani and Vakarelov [6].
4.4. Completeness
We now want to see that every formula true in the set of all PDL-frames is prov-
able in PDL∩0 . The general technique of the canonical model has to be modi>ed in
many details for our situation, for the simple reason that PDL∩0 is closed for the in-
ference rule of intersection, an in>nitary rule of inference. In this respect, Balbiani
and Vakarelov [6] introduced the concept of theory. Following the line of reasoning
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suggested by Goldblatt [8,9] within his framework for in>nitary modal logic, a set S
of formulas is said to be a theory if it satis>es the following conditions:
• if PDL∩0  then ∈ S;• if ∈ S and →  ∈ S then  ∈ S;
• if for all propositional variables p, [&(¬(〈'〉(∧p)∨ 〈(〉(∧¬p))?)] ∈ S then
[&(¬ 〈'∧ (〉?)] ∈ S;
where &(]?) is an admissible form, i.e., a theory is any set of formulas that contains
every formula provable in PDL∩0 and is closed under the inference rule of modus
ponens and the inference rule of intersection. We will use S, T , U , etc., for theories.
A theory S is called consistent if ⊥ =∈ S. By a maximal theory we mean a consistent
theory S such that for all formulas , ∈ S or ¬∈ S. The method of the canonical
model uses the following important lemma.
Lemma 5 (Lindenbaum’s lemma for PDL∩0 ). Let S be a consistent theory. There is
a maximal theory T such that S ⊆T .
Proof. See Balbiani and Vakarelov [6].
The canonical frame for PDL∩0 is the PDL-frame Fc =(Wc; Rc) where Wc is the
set of all maximal theories and Rc is the function with domain the set of all atomic
programs and range the set of all binary relations on Wc such that for all atomic
programs  and for all maximal theories S; T , SRc()T i@ []S = {: []∈ S}⊆T .
The canonical model for PDL∩0 is the PDL-model over Fc de>ned from the valuation Vc
on Fc such that for all propositional variables p, Vc(p)= {S: p∈ S}. The next lemma
is the fundamental lemma for canonical models.
Lemma 6 (Truth lemma for PDL∩0 ). Let  be a formula. For all maximal theories
S, the following conditions are equivalent:
• Mc; S |=;
• ∈ S.
Proof. For normal modal logics such as K , T , S4, etc., the proof of the truth lemma
can be done by induction on the complexity of . To prove the truth lemma for PDL∩0 ,
we have to use in parallel an additional induction. This additional induction involves
the new concept of maximal program. Like maximal theories, which are special sets
of formulas, maximal programs are special sets of programs, with a precise de>nition
that lies outside the scope of this paper. The interested reader is invited to consult the
paper of Balbiani and Vakarelov [6] for details.
We are now ready for the completeness theorem of PDL∩0 .
Theorem 7 (Completeness theorem of PDL∩0 ). Let  be a formula. If ∈L(PDL)
then PDL∩0 .
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Proof. By Lemmas 5 and 6.
We have no idea whether the resort to the inference rule of intersection is nec-
essary. In other words, we do not know whether the set of all formulas true in the
set of all PDL-frames is >nitely axiomatizable by an orthodox derivation system or
not. Orthodox completeness results for a syntactically restricted version of PDL∩0 in
which programs are built up from atomic programs by means of the operations of
composition and intersection are given in [3,5]. The completeness proof treated in Bal-
biani [3] draws from the subordination method of Hughes and Cresswell [12] whereas
Balbiani and Farin˜as del Cerro [5] base their line of reasoning on a suitable mod-
i>cation of the mosaic method of Marx and Venema [14]. Both arguments consist
in a step-by-step method for constructing irreEexive models. This brings us to the
question of whether the proofs in [3,5] can be extended in the presence of tests, a
question that remains unsolved, although [4] brings new ideas that may lead to a pos-
itive answer. Additional topics related to PDL∩0 , which space does not permit us to
discuss in depth, include the decidability=complexity issue of the satis>ability prob-
lem. Decidability of the satis>ability problem for PDL with intersection—PDL∩—is
proved in Danecki [7], but it is not known at present whether the upper bound of
deterministic exponential-time obtained for PDL in [15] carries over to PDL∩. Hence,
the satis>ability problem for PDL∩0 is decidable. However, there is no known results
concerning its inherent complexity. The intersection operator is also investigated in
Harel [11] which gives the proof that the satis>ability problem for PDL∩ is unde-
cidable if the semantics is modi>ed so as to refer only to deterministic programs
variables.
5. Dynamic extensions of arrow logic
In this section, we shall suppose that the set of atomic programs is equal to the
set {i; j: i; j∈{1; : : : ; n}}, these atomic programs corresponding for all arrow frames
F =(W; {R(i; j): i; j∈{1; 2}}), to the binary relations R(i; j). A number of constructs
can be de>ned from them such as the constructs •, ⊗ and id considered in [1,2,13] or
the constructs i considered in [17].
5.1. Syntax
The language of BALnPDL∩0 is obtained from the language of PDL
∩
0 by supposing
that the set of atomic programs is equal to the set {i; j: i; j∈{1; : : : ; n}}. Hence, the
set of all formulas and the set of all programs of the language of BALnPDL∩0 are
de>ned as follows:
•  ::=p | ⊥ | (→  ) | [&];
• & ::= i; j | (&; ') | (&∨ ') | (&∧ ') | ?;
where p ranges over a countably in>nite set of propositional variables and i; j range
over the set {1; : : : ; n}. What gives our language its interest is the possibility of
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de>ning modalities that are not de>nable in the language of basic arrow logic. To
illustrate the truth of this, one can consider formulas like 〈(1;1;?; 2;1)∧ 2;2〉 ,
〈1;2 ∧ 2;1〉 and 〈1;2 ∧ ?〉, in the particular case where n=2, or formulas like
[1;1 ∧ : : : i−1; i−1 ∧ i+1; i+1 ∧ · · · ∧n; n], in the general case where n¿3. The former
formulas correspond to the formulas  •  , ⊗ and id considered by Arsov [1], Arsov
and Marx [2] and Marx [13] whereas the latter formulas correspond to the formulas
[i] considered by Vakarelov [17].
5.2. Semantics
The standard semantics for this language is a Kripke-style semantics over arrow
frames. Let F =(W; {R(i; j): i; j∈{1; : : : ; n}}) be an arrow frame, V be a valuation
on F and M =(F; V ) be the model over F de>ned from V . We de>ne the
relation “formula  is true at arrow x in model M”, denoted M; x |=, as
follows:
• M; x |=p i@ x∈V (p);
• M; x |=⊥;
• M; x |=→  i@ if M; x |= then M; x |=  ;
• M; x |= [&] i@ for all y∈W , if x MR(&)y then M; y |=;
where the binary relations MR(&) on W corresponding to the modalities [&] reEect the
intended meanings of programs &:
• MR(i; j)=R(i; j);
• MR(&; ')= MR(&) ◦ MR(');
• MR(&∨ ')= MR(&)∪ MR(');
• MR(&∧ ')= MR(&)∩ MR(');
• MR(?)= {(x; x): M; x |=}.
The notions of truth in a model, truth in an arrow frame and truth in a set of
arrow frames are those de>ned in the section devoted to basic arrow logic. As a result,
L(ARROWn) and L(ARROWnNOR) will respectively denote the set of all formulas true
in the set of all arrow frames and the set of all formulas true in the set of all normal
arrow frames.
5.3. Axiomatization
What we have in mind is to propose complete axiomatic systems for L(ARROWn)
and L(ARROWnNOR). Concerning the axiomatization of L(ARROWn), let BALnPDL∩0
be the smallest normal logic in our extended language that contains all the instances
of the following axiom schemata:
• →〈i; i〉;
• → [i; j]〈j; i〉;
• 〈i; j〉〈j; k〉→〈i; k〉;
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• 〈&; '〉↔〈&〉〈'〉;
• 〈&∨ '〉↔〈&〉∨ 〈'〉;
• 〈&∧ '〉→〈&〉∧ 〈'〉;
• 〈&∧ ('∨ ()〉↔〈&∧ '〉∨ 〈&∧ (〉;
• 〈?〉 ↔∧  ;
and is closed under the following inference rule:
• If for all propositional variables p, BALnPDL∩0 [&(¬(〈'〉(∧p)∨ 〈(〉(∧¬p))?)] 
then BALnPDL∩0 [&(¬ 〈'∧ (〉?)] ;
where &(]?) is an admissible form. Concerning the axiomatization of L(ARROWnNOR),
let BALnPDL∩0NOR be the smallest normal logic in our extended language that contains
BALnPDL∩0 together with all the instances of the following axiom schema:
• → [1;1 ∧ · · · ∧n; n].
Seeing that the axiomatic system BALnPDL∩0 is obtained by adding the axiomatization
of PDL∩0 to the axiomatization of BAL
n, soundness of BALnPDL∩0 is easy to check.
Seeing that the schema → [1;1 ∧ · · · ∧n; n] modally de>nes ARROWnNOR within
ARROWn, soundness of BALnPDL∩0NOR follows immediately.
Theorem 8 (Soundness theorem of BALnPDL∩0 ). Let  be a formula. If BALnPDL∩0 
then ∈L(ARROWn).
Theorem 9 (Soundness theorem of BALnPDL∩0NOR). Let  be a formula. If
BALnPDL∩0 NOR  then ∈L(ARROWnNOR).
5.4. Completeness
Following the line of reasoning suggested in the proof of the completeness theorem
of PDL∩0 , the method of the canonical model can be used to demonstrate that every
formula true in the set of all arrow frames is provable in BALnPDL∩0 and every formula
true in the set of all normal arrow frames is provable in BALnPDL∩0NOR. Let L be
either BALnPDL∩0 or BAL
nPDL∩0NOR. The proof of the Lindenbaum’s lemma for L is
similar to the proof of the Lindenbaum’s lemma for PDL∩0 .
Lemma 10 (Lindenbaum’s lemma for L). Let S be a consistent theory. There is a
maximal theory T such that S ⊆T .
The canonical frame for L is the structure of the form Fc =(Wc; {Rc(i; j):
i; j∈{1; : : : ; n}}) where Wc is the set of all maximal theories and for all i; j∈{1; : : : ; n},
Rc(i; j) is the binary relation on Wc such that for all maximal theories S; T , SRc(i; j)T i@
[i; j]S = {: [i; j]∈ S}⊆T . The canonical model for L is the model over Fc de>ned
from the valuation Vc on Fc such that for all propositional variables p, Vc(p)= {S:
p∈ S}. The proof of the truth lemma for L is similar to the proof of the truth lemma
for PDL∩0 .
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Lemma 11 (Truth lemma for L). Let  be a formula. For all maximal theories S,
the following conditions are equivalent:
• Mc; S |=;
• ∈ S.
Using the schemata →〈i; i〉, → [i; j]〈j; i〉 and 〈i; j〉〈j; k〉→〈i; k〉, the
reader may easily verify that for all maximal theories S; T; U :
• [i; i]S ⊆ S;
• If [i; j]S ⊆T then [j; i]T ⊆ S;
• If [i; j]S ⊆T and [j; k ]T ⊆U then [i; k ]S ⊆U .
Hence, the canonical frame for L is an arrow frame. To see that the canonical frame
for BALnPDL∩0NOR is normal, we >rst need a useful lemma concerning the inference
rule of intersection.
Lemma 12. Let &; ' be programs. For all maximal theories S; T , the following con-
ditions are equivalent:
• [&∧ ']S ⊆T ;
• [&]S ⊆T and [']S ⊆T .
Proof. Suppose [&∧ ']S ⊆T , we demonstrate [&]S ⊆T and [']S ⊆T . If [&]S*T then
there is a formula  such that ∈ [&]S and  =∈T . Consequently, [&]∈ S. Hence,
[&∧ ']∈ S. It follows that ∈ [&∧ ']S. Since [&∧ ']S ⊆T , then ∈T , a contradic-
tion. As a conclusion, [&]S ⊆T . The proof that [']S ⊆T is similar.
Suppose [&]S ⊆T and [']S ⊆T , we demonstrate [&∧ ']S ⊆T . If [&∧ ']S*T then
there is a formula  such that ∈ [&∧ ']S and  =∈T . It follows that ¬∈T . In
order to show that [¬ 〈&∧ '〉 ¬?]⊥∈ S, we take an arbitrary propositional vari-
able p. Obviously, ¬∧p∈T or ¬∧¬p∈T . Since [&]S ⊆T and [']S ⊆T , then
〈&〉(¬∧p)∈ S or 〈'〉(¬∧¬p)∈ S. Thus, 〈&〉(¬∧p)∨ 〈'〉(¬∧¬p)∈ S and
[¬ (〈&〉(¬∧p)∨ 〈'〉(¬∧¬p))?]⊥∈ S. Seeing that S is closed under the inference
rule of intersection, therefore, [¬ 〈&∧ '〉 ¬?]⊥∈ S and ¬ [&∧ ']∈ S. Consequently,
[&∧ '] =∈ S and  =∈ [&∧ ']S, a contradiction. As a conclusion, [&∧ ']S ⊆T .
To infer that the canonical frame for BALnPDL∩0NOR is normal, let S; T be maximal
theories such that [1;1]S ⊆T; : : : ; [n; n]S ⊆T , we demonstrate S =T . Since [1;1]S ⊆
T; : : : ; [n; n]S ⊆T , then, by the lemma above, [1;1 ∧ · · · ∧n; n]S ⊆T . Seeing that the
schema ↔ [1;1 ∧ · · · ∧n; n] is provable in BALnPDL∩0NOR, therefore [1;1 ∧ · · ·
∧ n; n]S = S. Since [1;1 ∧ · · · ∧n; n]S ⊆T , then S =T . From all this, the complete-
ness theorem of BALnPDL∩0 and the completeness theorem of BAL
nPDL∩0NOR easily
follow.
Theorem 13 (Completeness theorem of BALnPDL∩0 ). Let  be a formula. If ∈L
(ARROWn) then BALnPDL∩0 .
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Theorem 14 (Completeness theorem of BALnPDL∩0NOR). Let  be a formula. If ∈
L(ARROWnNOR) then BALnPDL∩0 NOR .
Again, it is not known whether there exists a sound and complete orthodox proof
system capable of dealing with either BALnPDL∩0 or BAL
nPDL∩0NOR. Similarly, the
decidability of the satis>ability problem for either BALnPDL∩0 or BAL
nPDL∩0NOR is
still open.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we have presented deductive systems for BALnPDL∩0 and BAL
nPDL∩0
NOR which explore the following idea: although intersection of binary relations is not
de>nable in the ordinary language of modal logic it becomes de>nable in a modal
language strengthened by the introduction of propositional quanti>ers. The one draw-
back is that our deductive systems use an unorthodox inference rule: the inference
rule of intersection. The interesting question of course is to know whether the use of
this unorthodox inference rule is essential or not. In other words it is of the utmost
importance to determine whether the unorthodox inference rule of intersection can be
replaced with a recursively enumerable set of axioms, a question that remains unsolved.
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